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AnnexesINTRODUCTION
This Annual Report gives a general picture of thel
activities of the Mone tary Committee of the Euroflean
Economic Community in  1961.
The Monetary Committee was set up by Article 105  (2)
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity in order to promote the co-ordination of the policies
of Member States in monetary matters to the extent neces-
sary for the functioning of the Common Market.
In  1961  the Committee held seven sessions under the
chairmanship of Jonkheer  E.  van Lennep. The Deputy
Chairmen of the Committee are  M. P.  Calvet and  M. O.
Emminger. The list of Committee members is attached as
an annex to this Report.Chapter I
GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE IN THE FIELD
OF THE CO-ORDINATION OF MONETARY POLICIES
1. On 14 January 1962 the Council of the European Economic Community
officially confirmed that the essenCe of the objectives laid down in the Treaty of
Rome for the first stage of the transition period had in fact been achieved. The
move from the first to the second stage which has thus become a matter of his-
tory, provides an occasion to review the lessons learnt in four years of co-
ordinating the monetary policies of the Member States, the chief activity of the
Monetary Committee.
2. The progressive elimination of the obstacles to trade between the Member
States, provided for in the Treaty of Rome. and the J!;radual introduction of common
policies in various branches of the economy, require the fulfilment of certain con-
ditions in the monetary field. Freedom of transfer between the member countries
should be ensured in all the sectors liberalized, and precautions taken to avoid
any balance-of-payments crisis which might j.eopardize this freedom. In the mone-
tary and financial sphere ,harmonization must be such that" the economies of the
member countries can develop in a rational and balanced fashion. These conditions
will not be fulfilled unless the monetary and financial policies of the Member
States are closely co-ordinated. Though the Treaty of Rome maintains the sov-
ereigntyof the Member States in the monetary and fiscal fields , it expressly
provides for co-ordination of monetary and financial policy. The Monetary Com-
mittee was instituted to be the instrument of this co-ordination and to assist the
Council and the Commission in an advisory capacity.
3. The nature of the tasks entrusted to the Monetary Committee requires that its
work should be confidential and carried out in a restricted circle.The Committee
considered it desirable in pdnciple to limit its deliberations to the members of
the Committee themselves and their alternates. These officials hold important
posts in the ministries responsible for monetary and financial questions or 
the Central Banks of their respective countries, and are members of the Monetary
Committee in their capacity as experts. The Committee meets at frequent inter-
vals, usually once a month; at its meetings agreed views are worked out on how
the problems at issue should be solved, and these views are submitted to the
Council and the Commission as confidential documents.
It should be pointed out that the Monetary Committee is represented by its
chairman at the regular meetings of the Minist~rs of Finance of the Communitycountdes. The opinions of the Committee are thus heard at the level on which
policy decisions are taken, while the studies entrusted to the Committee by the
Ministers have in their turn helped to make these contacts closer.
The work done by the Monetary Committee has made it possible for those who shape monetary policy in the Member States to become more and more closely
acquainted with the economic and financial structure in the other Community countries and to acquire greater understanding of the policy followed by their
neighbours and, in particular, they will develop a feeling of collective responsi-
bility with regard to the general aims pursued by the Community.
4. The work of the Monetary Committee during the past four years has been
favoured by circumstances. Freedom of transfer between the Member States was
already extensive before the Treaty of Rome came into force and it was widened
at the end of 1958 when convertibility was introduced. Apart from the few initial difficulties which France had to face in the first year, no member country suffered
from balance-of-payments crises during the first stage on a scale which could
have endangered freedom of trade and freedom of transfer.
On the contrary, such problems as have arisen result from the overall sur- pluses registered by the member countries , with their repercussions in certain
non-member countries. It is laid down in the Treaty that the Community shall
remedy disequilibria in the balance-of-payments field, and this means in practice
that, once allowance has been made for a satisfactory level of r~serves , sur- pluses and deficits on the overall balance-of-payments should fluctuate around
zero, any surplus being subsequently offset by a deficit, and vice versa.
Equilibrium as here defined must be compatible with a high level of employ-
ment, a satisfactory pace of economic growth and a relative stability of prices; it
must also be established with due regard to the desire of the Member States to
furnish sufficient financial aid to the developing countries.
5. One of the general aims of the Treaty of Rome is freedom of movement for
capital. To achieve this the Monetary Committee assists the Council and the Com- mission in the manner laid down in Title III, Chapter 4, of the Treaty.
The Member States have undertaken a triple commitment. They must in the first place endeavour to maintain the level of liberalization already reached.
They must also agree on directives laying down minimum objectives for the pro- gressive liberalization of capital movements. These directives are mandatory.
Finally, in Article 71 of the Treaty the Member States have declared their read-
iness to go beyond the minimum level of liberalization of capital, movements
where their economic situation permits.
In the first stage of the transition period considerable progress was made in
this field. The work done in this connection by the Monetary Committee, dudng
1961 is analysed in greater detail in Chapter II, Section 3, of this Report.
1:$6. The commitments undertaken in the matter of capital movements between
the Member States make greater co-ordination of policies even more necessary.
Failure to harmonize rates of interest, for instance, might easily lead to disturb-
ances in the movements of capital between Member States.
In principle, economic integration presupposes stability in exchange parities
between the currencies of the Member States. However, this is no reason, at
least in the transition period, to forbid the adjustment of exchange parities
entirely, particularly if the adjustment manifestly furthers other important Commu-
nity objectives, as was the case, for instance, with the devaluation of the French
franc at the end of 1958.
The revaluations of the German mark and the guilder decided on in March
1961 are due less to imbalances in relations with the other Member States than
to imbalances in relations with non-member countries. Although the Monetary
Committee had studied this problem ~everal times in the past
, the final decisions
on these changes were not preceded by perfect co-ordination within the 
Community.
7. The Mone tary Committee has examined the ins truments of monetary policy at
present available to the different member countries. The results of this examina-
tion are discussed in Chapter II, Section 2. On the whole the instruments of
monetary policy differ less at present than when the Common Market was initiated
Nevertheless , the range of available means varies considerably from State to
State and the circumstances in which they are used differ. Despite these differ-
ences, however, the authorities of the various member countries are generally in
a position to counteract any disturbances likely to occur in practice.
This does not mean that there is no reason to rdnforce the instruments 
monetary policy and, a fortiori, the weapons available to economic policy as a
whole. The economic aims of the Cqmmunity are numerous and the elimination of
obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons in fact
deprives the competent authorities of one class of weapon. If therefore the aims
of the Community are to be attained, certain Member States may find it advisable
to make good these losses by evolving other methods of influencing the economy.
It woilldin any case seem important that means should be available to exert
greater influence on the trend of production costs. Moreover it is essential not
just to complete the arsenal of weapons, but to be sure that all those which exist
already - and they are not all within the province of the Monetary Committee -
are used in a co-ordinated manner.
If things move in this direction, the gradual attainment of the various aims
which form part of the Common Market will mean that when the time comes to
change over from co-ordination to centralization of decisions, the transition will
appear to be nothing more than one more step 
forward. Quite apart from purely
political factors, which are outside the competence of the Committee, technical
grounds will prevent this transit~on being made before the economic and financial
structure of the Member States has been made much more homogeneous. Just as
the move to convertibility appeared possible only when the situation was ripe onthe internal plane in the different COuntries, so too their economic and financial Structure will have to undergo many changes before it will in practice be possible to adopt a more centralized policy.
8. It should never be forgotten that the satisfactory economic development registered during the first stage of the transition period is in part attributable to exceptionally favourable circumstances. It would be foolhardy to assume that these favourable factors will continue to exist and to imagine that there is no reason to fear a recrudescence of balance-of-payments difficulties in the countries
of the Community.
In order to prevent any such difficulties leading to a reversal of the move- ment towards liberalization, the Treaty provides various possibilities for mutual aid. These include the granting of limited credits by other Member States, subject to agreement of the latter. The aim of this mutual help, which must be approved by the Council on a recommendation from the Commission and after consultation
of the Monetary Committee, is to assist in overcoming temporary balance-of- payments difficulties. The Council' s approval must be coupled with recommenda- tions on measures calculated to remedy the difficulties encountered by the State
seeking assistance.
The Monetary Committee has nOt felt it necessary to define in detail the criteria to be applied in the event of an application for mutual aid taking the
form of a request for a loan, for the problem has never arisen and an a priori regu-
lation did not appear in any way called for. Moreover, the Committee considers the regular and detailed examinations of the economic and financial situation 
the Member States, made by the most highly qualified representatives 
from these States, enable it to make an immediate study of any application for mutual help. Maintenance of these disciplines and continuance of these studies are indispen-
sable if the Committee is not to be caught unprepared by an urgent case.
9. In addition to mutual aid, the possibility of recourse to IMF is always open
in case of a balance-of-payments deficit. The close co-ordination of the monetary and economic policies of the Member States, the common interest of the Commu- nity countries in financinJ!; any payments deficit of one among them and the con- ditions in which such financing would take place are so many factors which require that recourse by a Member State to the IMF facilities should be preceded
by consultation within the Community. Any other attitude would indeed be illogical in view of the many and thorough studies made by the Monetary Committee of the
monetary and economic trend and of the policies applied. Article 108 of the Treaty
of Rome in fact expressly refers to this concerted action in dealings with other
international organizations to which the Member States may have recourse.
10. The increasingly close co-ordination of monetary policy within the Commu- nity makes a COmmon position on international monetary problems more and more
desirable. Liberalization of payments within the Community finds its natural extension in the liberalization of multilateral payments between the Community
and non-member countries. The achievement of the aims of the Treaty therefore demands that the Member States should be constandy on the watch to maintain and strenghten the present system of convertibility.This being so, the Community countries must also consult each other 
questions arising from their responsibilities in monetary matters towards the oUt-
side world. In view of the scale of the surpluses registered by the Member States
in recent years, the main requirement which at present stems from these responsi-
bilities is for .a reasonable policy in granting credits. The large amounts placed
at the disposal of the deficit countries by the Member States of the Community
show that this re sponsibility is fully appreciated. Of a total of $ 2 500 million
outstanding drawing on IMF at the end of 1961 the Counterpart of $ 1 050 million was
supplied by the Community countries and $ 650 million by the United States. About
$ 700 million had been made available from the gold reserv.es of the Fund. Of
these drawings, then, 40% were financed by the Community countries, whose
initial quotas scarcely represented 10% of all IMF quotas. To  these  credits must
be added very important commitments under the Paris Agreement of 13 December
1961 (see Point 20).
11. In these circumstances Member States should reach agreement on a common
analysis of the economic and financial situation, of the balance-of-payments
position and of the policy followed by the countries with a deficit. A common
attitude on the need to strengthen the international payments system even further
and on the role which the Community might play in this respect should also be
adopted.
The work done by the Monetary Committee has cle?rly facilitated the task of
the six member countries in their search for a solution to this problem. There is
indeed cause for congratulation in the almost complete identity of views achiev.ed
among the Community countries at the 1961 negotiations on ways of increasing
the resources of the IMF.CHAPT ER II
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE IN 1961
12. As already mentioned in Chapter I, the main activity of the Committee during
1961 again consisted in regular examinations of the monetary and financial
situation in the various Member States. Details of this work are to be found in
Section I of Chapter Ill, together with the re.commendations pUt forward by the
Committee. The present Chapter covers the more important of the Committee
other activities.Section I
INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY AND THE WORLD SYC:TEM OF PAYMENTS
13. The problems of the balance of payments, especially those caused 
short-term capital movements between various countries led to international
discussions on the world monetary systems and to proposals which would mean
more or less profound changes if not complete reorganization of the system. As
already mentioned in the previous Report the Monetary Committee, in compliance
with the wishes expressed by the Community s Ministers of Finance, appointed a
group of experts headed by Dr. Emminger, Vice-Chairman of the Committee and a
member of the Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank, to study the problem of
international liquidity. In the middle of 1961 this working party submitted a
Report on current problems of international liquidity , the findings of which
were endorsed by the Committee.
14. The group of experts examined the situation and the immediate outlook and
also analysed in detail certain proposals for improvements in the international
monetary system. The conclusions reached are summed up below.
15. Itseemedclear that there was no reason to fear that, in the immediate or near
future, a general shortage of international liquidity would lead to the emergence
of deflationary trends on a world scale. On the contrary, it appeared that the per-
sistent trends towards creeping inflation which were still a major source of con-
cern almost everywhere meant that any artificial expansion of international
liquidity would merely aggravate the inflationary trends.
This general conclusion is not invalidated by the existence of strains caused
by imbalances which produced heavy surpluses in certain west European countries
while other countries, among them the United States and Great Britain, registered
large deficits: these imbalances had to be redressed, whatever the international
monetary system in force, or whatever the method used for building up reserves.
What was needed to improve the balance-of-payments situation was not a defla-
tionary policy in countries that had shown a deficit, but an effort to avoid inflation
(especially cost inflation), for everywhere else in the world, and particularly in
countries with a surplus, expansionary forces were still well to the fore.
16. A weakness of the present system was no doubt that in the long run the
foreseeable supply of monetary gold might not suffice to meet fully the interna-
tional requirements of monetary reserves, and that there are limits to the increase
in international holdings of foreign exchange reserves: it would demand a sub-
stantial increase in the net indebtedness of the key currency countries - theUnited States and Great Britain - and this would itself be conditional on the
readiness of other countries to hold these reserve currencies; it would also lead
to some instability in the system known as the gold exchange standard. However
no pressing problems should arise in the course of the next few years, for this
weakness in the present system was appreciably offset by the extensive credit
facilities available on the international plane. It was none the less true that the
key currencies were still vulnerable to movements of short- term capital, espe-
cially if the situation in the countries concerned did not inspire full confidence.
17. After studying the various proposals for improvements in the present monetary
system, especially the supply of readily available money, the experts concluded
thatitwas neither advisable nor expedient to raise the price of gold; they thought
it possible to solve the current rather acute problems without resorting to a meas-
ure inl which the drawbacks would greatly outweigh any possible advantages. The
general introduction of fluctuating exchange rates was also considered inappro-
priate, because of the dislocation it would cause to trade and capital movements.
Again, proposals for reorganizing the IMF into a sort of international central bank
did not seem practicable at the present time.
lB. There was , however, no doubt that the working of the present monetary
system could be improved. According to the findings of the Report the leading
industrial .countries should, both by their own efforts and through effective inter-
national co-operation, endeavour to:
Improve the equilibrium of the balance of payments without delay;
Take action to remedy the difficulties caused by sudden and disorderly move-
ments of short-term capital, as these threaten to disrupt the existing inter-
na tional monetary system.
19. In this connection closer collaboration between the central banks, both in
order to forestall capital movements due to differences in interest rates and to
offset speculative currency movements, led at the time of the Sterling crisis in
spring 1961 to a series of arrangements known as the Basle Agreements. By their
very nature however, these credit arrangements constitute no more than limited
short-term assistance; they could be no more than a It first line of defence , to
be backed up by supplementary remedies.
20. The experts, who felt that a more thorough study and closer co-ordination
were necessary, welcomed the suggestion that there should be a It second line of
defence " resting on a system of special credits - within the framework of inter-
national institUtions - as this would strenghten the present monetary system by
making it less sensitive to sudden crises of confidence. The agreement reached
on 13 December 1961 by the Ministers of Finance of ten industrialized countries
members of the International Monetary Fund, is an attempt to solve this problem.
Its aim is to facilitate the task of the Fund, under conditions of freer (converti-
bility, by enabling it to procure additional resources with which to forestall or
counteract movements that might endanger the international monetary system.The common market coUntries' share of $ 2 450 million in the standby credit
of $ 6 000 million constitutes more than BO% of the credits in currencies other
than key currencies. By its very existence this agreement makes a substantial
contribution towards averting grave disturbances in the monetary system of the
Western world.Section II
THE INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY
21. The work of the Monetary Committee in this field covered two questions: the
instruments of monetary policy within Member States, and monetary and financial
policy in the event of a recession. An account is given below of the study of
these two questions.
A. The instruments of monetary policy
22. From the outset the Committee s regular studies of the monetary and financial
situation in the Member States have shown how necessary it is to have a careful
analysis made of the means of action available to the Central Banks and the other
monetary authorities: bank rate policy, compulsory special deposits, open market
operations and also the possibility of using public financial operations to fi-
nance the liquidity of the banks and the economy. The significance of these
weapons in the Member States was not always very clear, and in any case the
circumstances in which they were used were not sufficiently known.
23. The Committee therefore suggested that the services of the Commission
should make the necessary studies in collaboration with the monetary authorities
of the Member States. These individual studies for each country and a synoptic
review comparing the situation in all countries of the Community have been used
as a basis of discussion in the Monetary Committee itself, which intends to have
the studies expanded and brought up to date with developments as they occur.
The extensive knowledge gained in this way will make it easier to align the
instruments and methods of monetary policy in the various countries. As a result
of the discussions in the Committee its members can improve their own monetary
policies in the light of the experience gained by the other countries in using the
various instruments ~f monetary policy. The adoption in Belgium at the beginning
of 1962 of measures for the creation of a $ystem of compulsory deposits and the
previous institution in France of a special system of minimum reserves may in
this connection be looked upon as steps inspired by the Committee s work.
24. It has been decided that these stUdies on the instruments of monetary policy
in the individual states of the Community shall be published together with the
synoptic review.B.  MOne tary and financial policies in the ev.ent of a recession
25. As stated in the third report on the activities of the Monetary Committee , it
had been agreed with the Economic Policy Committee of .the EEC that the Mone-
tary Committee should consider the monetary and financial measures that should
be tak.en in the event of a re.cession. Though the present economic situation and
the outlook for the near future rob this matter of any immediate interest, the
possibility of importing a recession or of a deterioration in the situation within
the Community should not be ruled out. The Economic Policy Committee therefore
sent out a questionnaire on the means that can at present be used to deal with
such a situation and on the criteria applied by Member States in deciding that
action is needed.
26. In this connection the Monetary Committee also drew up a questionnaire on
any monetary and financial policies that were being planned. The members of the
Committee replied to this questionnaire for each of the Common Market countries
and a synoptic review of their replies was prepared. Early in 1962 these docu-
ments, together with an accompanying memorandum, were submitted to the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee and to the Commission of the European Economic
Community .
27. For its part the Economic Policy Committee' will add this material to its .own
studies. It will use the collated information in pursuing its own work and in any
papers it may submit, with appropriate proposals, to the Community institutions
concerned.Sect ion 1/1
LlBERALIZA TION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
28. The first Directive pursuant to Article 67 of the Treaty, adopted on 11 May
1960 by .the Council of the European Economic Community, requires the Monetary
Committee to examine at least once a year the restrictions still applied to move-
ments of capital and to suggest which of these restrictions could be lifted. The
Committee carried out the first of these examinations in 1961. It found that the
Member States - where they had not actually gone beyond the degree of libera-
lization laid down in the Directive - had taken the necessary steps to fulfil
the obligations arising therefrom. In some cases the Member States had at the
same time removed restrictions on certain types of capital movement in respect
of which the Directive did not require immediate action.
Moreover, the Committee noted with satisfaction that - with the exception
of a few cases of little significance or of pure form - the Member States
had also extended to non-member states the measures they had taken. The
Committee attaches particular importance to this wider liberalization of capital
movements and welcomes every effort to further the process, including the
measures taken in this connection in other international organizations, notably
in OECD.
29. In making this first examination the Committee bore in mind the fact that
the first Directive pursuant to Article 67 had not long been in force and it re-
frained from proposing more extensive measures of liberalization; none the less
it reviewed certain problems which it considered to be of prime importance and
submitted to the Commission its views on the points in question.
30. The first of these concerns transfers of capital on the free market. Here the
rates can fluctuate more widely than on the controlled markets where, under
IMF rules, fluctuations are kept within certain limits. The question came up
for study because from January to May 1961 the rates on the free market of the
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union had differed from the rates on the controlled
market by 2. 2 to 3.6%. These differences subsequently disappeared and today
there is no problem. Nevertheless, the Monetary Committee wishes to stress the
importance it attaches to the maintenance of the greatest possible stability in
exchange rates, particularly with regard to direct investment and the other
capital operations covered by Article 1 of the Directive.
31. The Committee also tackled the problem of the authorization procedures
which some Member States are still applying to certain movements of capital.EVen where these have been liberalized under the Directive, these procedures
have now been simplified in order to eliminate any risk of delay in executing the
relevant transactions.
32. Finally the Committee considered the question of the floating of loans on
the capital markets of the several States. In this connection the first Directive
authorizes the maintenance of restrictions where liberalization in this field
might hamper a Member State in the attainment of its economic objectives. The
right to maintain restrictions has been exercised in France, the Netherlands and
Italy. Nevertheless some progress was made in this field last ye.ar. The Nether-
lands, for instance, allowed non-residents to raise a considerable amount in
loans on the Dutch capital market; Italy too, which for a long while had not
allowed foreigners to draw on its capital market, agreed that international organ-
izations at least should be able to raise loans.
33. If the obstacles still hampering the issue of foreign securities on the capital
markets of Community countries are to be removed - this moVe finding a natural
corollary in the freer admission of foreign stocks and shares to the stock ex-
changes - it will be necessary, owing to the differing fiscal system, to eliminate
the factors distorting transactions between member countries. The Committee
therefore tackled some of these questions and discussed among other points the
problem of taxes on transfers of capital; it felt that everything should be done
to allow .capital to circulate as freely as possible, and that in particular any
obstacles presented by taxes on capital transfers should be eliminated These
questions , to the solution of which the Committee attaches great importance for
reason s of monetan- policy and in o.rder to liberalize the capital market, are at
present being dealt with in committees of experts from Community countries.Chapter  III
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POSITION  OF  THE
MEMBER STA TES IN  1961GENERAL
34. In 1961 economic expansion continued. Although on the whole the progress
registered was somewhat less than in 1960, it was nevertheless very satisfactory.
The real gross national product in the Community, according to initial estimates
increased by almost 5.5%, compared with nearly 7% in 1960. The chief reason
for this lower rate of advanfe is the exhaustion of man-power reserves,partic..
ularly in West Germany, France and .the Netherlands. In other countries, where
manpower reserves had still been considerable, there was an appreciable fall in
unemployment. The lower rate of expansion is therefore attributable to insufficient
capacity rather. than to any weakening of demand.
35. In fact, internal demand remained on the whole very firm. The propensity to
invest was strengthened by the increasing need for rationalization, and consumer
demand continued to rise rapidly in step with the appreciable advance, of house:-
hold incomes. The rise in these incomes was mainly due to pay increases, which
in most member countries rose faster than productivity.
36. This trend has made it rather more difficult to keep prices stable. On the
whole, however, rises were not very marked, since keener competition led some
sectors to narrow their profit margins rather than to pass higher costs on to the
consumer.
37. Exports progressed more slowly in 1961 than in 1960, and the rise in imports
from non-member countries was appreciably smaller than in 1960, largely because
of the cautious stock-building policy of enterprises. The most recent estimates
show that, as in 1960, the Community s trade balance was practically in equi-
librium, while the surplus on services was slightly down. The fact that the gold
and foreign exchange teserves of the monetary institutions went up by only
about $ 1 200million in 1961, compared with $ 3300 million in  1960  is explained
by transactions with the 1M F and other private and public transfers of capital.
A policy of moderate interest rates discouraged the inflow of short-term money
whilst the outflow of capital was considerable.
38. The surplus on external transactions made for greater liquidity in the money
markets, and the banks had no difficulty in meeting the increased demand for
credit resulting from the continued high level of business activity. As firms had
a smaller margin available for self-financing yet showed a marked propensity to
invest, greater calls were made on the financial market.Section /I
THE POSITION IN THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
AND THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
39. In its last Report the Committee discus sed the economic policy dilemma
which faced the Federal Republic of Germany in 1960, when the balance of
payments was showing considerable surpluses, despite the high level of internal
demand and the great strain on the apparatus of production. Various measures
taken since the autumn of 1960 by the Federal Government and the monetary
policy applied concurrently by the Bundesbank are clear illustrations of the
efforts of the responsible authorities to resolve the difficulties arising from this
situation. The 5% revaluation of the mark on 6 March 1961 contributed to an
improvement in the internal and external balance which was particularly notice-
able in the second half of 1961.
40. In 1961 the real gross national product went up 5.3%, as against 8.3% in
1960. This slackening of the growth rate is mainly attributable to the manpower
shortages which hampered the expansion of production in numerous sectors.
Although demand by households and public authorities again moved ahead with
little loss of momentum, demand from abroad and the demand for equipment goods
tended to ease from the spring of 1961 onward.
41. The general trend of prices was slightly upwards throughout the year. Prices
increased chiefly in the sectors least exposed to foreign competition in partie..
ular building and construction and in certain services. Pay rises of about 10%
were distinctly higher than the gain in productivity. The resulting rise in pro-
duction costs led to a reduction in profits in many branches of industry and to
certain price increasest which would have been larger if the mark had not been
revalued.
42. The highest surpluses both on the trade balance and on current account were
reached during the early months of 1961. In the second half of the year the sur-
pluses on trade fell slowly and there was a deficit on invisible transactions.
This reduced the surplus on current account to $ 760 million. As a result 
considerable advance repayments of external debts ($ 800 million), the balanceof payments showed a deficit of about $ 150 million. In addition, owing to a
substantial increase in contributions to the International Monetary Fund ($ 330
million), the Bundesbank' s total net reserves fell by nearly $ 480 million in
1961 , whereas they had gone up sharply in 1960.
43. By lowering interest rates and lifting certain credit restrictions, the monetary
authorities have avoided the shrinkage of liquid funds thad would otherwise
have been caused by the higher holdings of public money in the Bundesbank and
the outflow of foreign exchange, which began about the middle of the year. It
was thus possible on the whole to meet the cash requirements of the economy.
44. In the field of public finance the distribution of tax revenue between the
Federal Government, the Lander and the local authorities gives rise to certain
problems of monetary and economic policy. Certain adjustments in this field
would make it possible for financial policy to be more clos~ly adapted to the
needs of the economic situation.
45. As the Committee has pointed out, a continuation of the present trend in 
the balance of payments would not constitute a threat to the Federal Republic.
Even if it meant a temporary reduction in reserves, this would be welcome from
the point of view of international liquidity. How official exchange reserves
subsequently shape will depend above all on the structure of the balance of
capital transactions. It should be possible to increase German exports of private
capital, in particular by means of foreign issues on the financial market of the
Federal Republic. Such is sue s would be facilitated by a reduc tion of long-term
interest rates. The Monetary ' Committee also recommends that in future aid to
developing countries should not be tied, legally or in practice, to purchases of
German good~.
FRANCE
46. In its last Report the Committee noted that the improvement in the economic
and financial situation of France had continued in 1960.
47. Developments were again favourable in 1961, and France has now for three
years expedenced regular expansion in a climate of relative stability. According
to preliminary estimates, the gross national product went up about 5% by volume
as against a little over 6% in 1960, so that taking the two years together the aims
of the Interim Plan have been slightly exceeded. The maintenance of a high rate
of expansion is the result of an increase of internal demand and of exports
with the exception of those exports which go to the franc area. Stimulated by the
need to cope with the shortage of skilled manpower and with foreign competition
firms have stepped up their fixed investments more rapidly. Consumption has been
encouraged by an appreciable rise in household incomes linked with the increase
in wages, in agricultural earnings and in transfer incomes.48. During the closing months of the year the upward trend of prices became
more marked. It was attriburable in part to the slow but fairly constant rise in
the price of manufactures as a result of wages increasing more rapidly than
average productivity and of the inevitable rise in .the prices of services,partic-
ulady rents; more important however were the increases in agricultural prices;
in certain cases these exceeded the usual seasonal rise and ' were the conse-
quence of less plentiful harvests, but more often they resulted from decisions by
which the public authorities sought to give farmers a larger share in the national
income. By liberalizing trade, by reducing customs duties before the appointed
date and by adopting certain taxation measures, the French Government showed
its determination to prevent any excessive rise in the cost of living.
49. Exports to foreign countries continued to develop favourably. A more hesitant
trend in imports, which reflected a decline in purchases of non-franc petroleum
and agricultural products, coupled with a more cautious stock-holding policy,
led to a distinct improvement in the balance of trade, particularly in the latter
half of the year. Despite large advance repayments of foreign debts ($ 320 million),
the balance of payments closed with a surplus of more than $ 1 000 million.
France was thus able to increase its official foreign exchange reserves by $ 870
million while contributing larger amounts to the International Monetary Fund
($ 235 million).
50. As in 1960, surpluses on the balance of payments helped to maintain abun-
dant liquidity on the money and capital markets. Because of the rapid rise (18%)
in the amount of cash credits granted by the banks and other financial institu-
tions, the Banque de France sent a warning to the banks on 23 November 1961
and, with effect from 28 February 1962, imposed a figure of 32% as ag~inst 30%
under the special system of minimum reserves (coefficient de tresorerie) intro-
duced a year earlier.
51. Some caution is indeed called for in monetary and financial policy~ The
situation at home and abroad continues on the whole to be satisfactory but, as
the Monetary Committee has pointed out, care must be taken to' avoid the tendeQcy ,
for prices to rise being reinforced, thanks to excess liquidity, by a sudden surge
of demand; this could jeopardize stability at home and, in the longer term, affect
the balance of payments. But the surpluses are for the present sufficiently large
for it to be possible and desirable for the French authorities to pursue their
policy of repaying foreign debts in advance.
ITALY
52. In its last Report the Committee concluded that economic expansion in
Italy would continue without any cause for uneasiness either on the domestic or
the foreign plane.53. The economic situation continued to be very favourable in Italy and in the
last months of 1961 it even improved. According to the preliminary estimates,
the gross national product went up more than 7% by volume, roughly as much as
in 1960. This favourable trend reflected an expansion of demand both at home
and from abroad. Investment by enterprises grew rapidly and consumer demand
showed a sharp rise thanks to an advance of household incomes attributable in
particular to higher employment and a rise in real wages. In some branches of
industry, wages rose faster than productivity, but on the whole prices remained
stable.
54. Demand from abroad .also grew rapidly. Exports in the second half-year rose
more than imports and the resulting improvement in the trade balance, in con-
junction with a rise in receipts from services, led to an appreciably higher
surplus (about $ 365 million) on current account. In spite of certain advance
repayments of external debts, the balance of payments closed with a surplus of
nearly $ 580 million. Italy was thus able to increase its official foreign exchange
reserves by about $ 340 million while making .a large contribution ($ 175 million)
to the International Monetary Fund.
55. The surpluses on the balance of payments helped in no small measure to
increase internal liquidity. Nevertheless, a shortage of re~py funds obliged
firms to make heavier calls on the money and capital markets. This resulted in
some tightness , which however was only temporary, since the policy of the
authorities was to maintain adequate liquidity.
56. The Committee therefore can do no more than reiterate the conclusions of
its earlier reports. Approximate equilibrium in the balance of payments should
be achieved and temporary deficits might even be accepted in view of the favour-
able situation of Italy s exchange reserves. If various factors are now working
towards a reduction ofthe balance-of-payment surpluses, the policy of the Italian
authorities can facilitate the play of these correctives. It is essential that in
the fie1dof public finance programmes for the expenditure of public money should
be executed by the dates laid down.
In addition, the policy of reducing Italy s foreign indebtedness by advance
repayments should be continued and greater efforts should be made to liberalize
capital movements by abolishing the remaining administrative obstacles and by
taking further steps on the road towards liberalization.
NETHERLANDS
57. In its last Report the Committee described the dilemma presented to the
Netherlands
' '
authorities by the conflicting requirements of domestic and of
external equiiibrium.58. The  boom  conditions which were a feature of 1960, and which had produced obvious signs of strain, continued in 1961. According to initial estimates the gross national product in real terms increased by ahout 2.5%; the rise in 1960 had been nearly 7%. This definite deterioration was mainly due to growing man- power shortages, aggravated by a fairly rapid reduction of working hours in the
spring and summer of 1961. These developments led to a temporary fall in pro- duction and in general some increase of wage costs per unit of output. Thus reduction of supply rather than weakening of demand was responsible for the
slackening of activity which occurred during the year.
59. Domestic demand in fact remained lively. On the one hand investment
particularly for rationalization, advanced very rapidly; on the other, demand by households was brisk, despite a slight fall-off in the middle of the year. The rising trend of home prices became stronger.
60. Exports continued their advance in 1961 although at a reduced pace. The
more rapid increase of imports, encouraged by the 5% revaluation of the guilder
on 6 March, adversely affected the trade balance. The surplus on current trans-
actions was about $  140  million. Largely as a result of advance repayments of foreign debts ($ 50 million), the balance of payments showed a slight deficit ($ 90, million). Owing inter alia to increased contributions to the International Monetary Fund (~120 million), the official foreign exchange reserves fell 
about $ 55 million.
61. Some temporary tightness was felt on the money market, but the Central Bank reduced the cash reserve ratios and also increased the liquidity of the
banks through its open-market operations. By the end of the year the symptoms of tightness had disappeared.
62. The economic and financial situation does not seem to call for any special
comment at present. According to forecasts, the surplus on current transactions
in 1962 may be lower than in 1961, and may not even be enough to finance normal
exports of capital. However, as the Monetary Committee pointed out, the question arises whether wages may not exceed the limits contemplated and become a threat to domestic stability and external balance.
BELGIUM
63. The Committee has in the past emphasized the need for Belgium to carry
out structural reforms in certain important sectors of its economy and to put its
public finances in order; an expansion of economic activity based in the main on exports and investments could contribute to the achievement of these reforms.
64. The economic trend in 1961 has largely responded to these requirements.
According to initial estimates the growth of the gross national product in real
terms was slightly over 3% ;)t was thus roughly the same as in 1960.65. Internal demand was buoyant. Productive investment by enterprises advanced
strongly. To some extent this reflects the implementation of programmes bene-
fiting from advantages under the laws passed in July 1959 to stimulate the
economy. Activity was also very high in the construction sector, but consumer
demand increased only moderately, largely because of the relatively small rise
in household incomes.
66. Since productivity on the whole went up more than wages, enterprises
enjoyed more latitude for self-financing and some prices fell, thus improving
the competitive position of Belgian products on foreign markets.
67. This trend favoured exports, which were also encouraged by boom conditions
in the other member countries. Imports, particularly of equipment goods, also
rose appreciably. It may be expected that the balance of current payments will
show a surplus of about $ 110 million. The overall balance of payments showed a
small surplus of some $ 15 million. An additional $ 70 million was transferred to
the Interna tional Monetary Fund. The net increase in the gold and foreign ex-
change reServes of the Banque nationale de Belgique amounted to $ 170 million.
68. Fairly easy conditions prevailed on the money and capital markets.. Bank
rate was reduced in three steps from 5% to 4.25%. Finally, a reform of the money
market was put through at the beginning of 1962.
69.. The increase in budget rec~ipts resulting from favourable economic con-
ditions and from certain fiscal measures made it possible ~o reduce the cash
deficit. The short-term foreign indebtedness grew until May but increased no
further after that date and has now been partly funded.
70. The Committee points out that the favoura~le international business situation
will, if it continues, doubtl~ss help to sustain activity in Belgium and so facil-
itate structural improvement and the strengthening of the country s finances. It
also notes that an increase. in overall savings is still required if the Belgian
economy is to reach and sustain the level of expansion and investment envisaged.
However, as an increase in the present high level of private savings is hardly to
be expected, the overall increase must come mainly from the public sector. The
Belgian authorities have succeeded in balancing the ordinary budget and this
has made some progress possible in the direction of sounder finance. But to
create genuine public savings there must be a broader concept of public finances
allowing part of the investment programme to be financed out of ordinary revenue.
LUXEMBOURG
71. The economic situation in Luxembourg continued to develop favour ably in
1961, although in the last quarter of the year there was a certain slow-down due
mainly to a weakening of the iron and steel market. This was reflected in a
slight fall in production and a fall in selling prices. On the whole, however, thesituation remains favourable. Tax revenue has substantially increased under the
influence of boom conditions. The Government s financial position is still very
strong, and it has been possible to build up reServes for an anticyclicalfina.ncial
policy in the event of a recession.Section III
OUTLOOK
72. By studying present ec.onomic trends it is possible to forecast the main
lines of development in the first half of 1962.
73. First, it seems that demand is likely to remain buoyant. On the one hand
external trade should continue to show slight surpluses, at least during the
coming months , for it may be expected that the recovery in the United States and
some other industrial countries will continue and lead to further increases in
their purchases from the Community.
74. Internal demand, too, will remain at a high level, although the rate of
increase in investment by enterprises may falloff owing to the narrower margins
for self-financing or the less urgent need to increase production capacity in some
b~anches. To judge by the number of building permits issued, activity in the
construction sector, on the other hand, should increase.
Private consumption should also rise appreciably. Wage increases granted
in 1961 or early 1962 will push up mass incomes, even if the growth of the
working population is smaller than hitherto.
To judge by the pudgets presented in the member countries , a sizable
increase can be predicted in public expenditure on investment and consumer
goods.
75. The wide-spread labour shortages will probably continue in the first half
of 1962. Higher costs may mean a rise in prices. This can only be kept within
bounds if the increase in incomes does not greatly exceed the gain in produc-
tivity and if an expansion of imports makes up for the inelasticity of internal
supply.
76. Nevertheless, the Community current transactions with the rest of the
world will probably show a considerable surplus. It is therefore still necessary,
as already emphasized by the Committee in its previous Report, that the Member
States pursue a liberal policy in the fields of trade and of capital movements.ANNEX I
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